Using process groups to implement failure detection in asynchronous environments by Ricciardi, Aleta M. & Birman, Kenneth P.
Using Process Groups /_ 7_
to Implement Fallure Detectlon _o
In Asynchronous Envlronments*
Aleta M. Ricciardi
Kenneth P. Birman
TR 91-1188
February 1991
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-7501
*Research supported in part by DARPNNASA Ames Grant NAG 2-593, and in part
by grants from IBM and Siemens Corp.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910009350 2020-03-19T19:40:31+00:00Z

Using Process Groups to Implement
Failure Detection in Asynchronous Environments 1
Aleta M. Ricciardi
CorneU University
Department of Computer Science
Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
aleta@cs.cornell.edu
Kenneth P. Birman
CorneU University
Department of Computer Science
Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
ken_cs.cornell.edu
February 7, 1991
tResearch supported in part by DARPA/NASA Ames Grant NAG 2-593, and in part by grants from IBM a,,,I
Siemens Corp.
Abstract
Agreement on the membership of a group of processes in a distributed system is a basic problem that arises
in a wide range of applications. Such groups occur when a set of processes co-operate to perform some
task, share memory, monitor one another, subdivide a computation, and so forth. In this paper we discuss
the Group Membership Problem as it relates to failure detection in asynchronous, distributed systems. We
present a rigorous, formal specification for group membership under this interpretation. We then present a
solution for this problem that improves upon previous work.
Ifeywords Asynchronous computation; Fault detection; Fault tolerance; Distributed Consensus; Member-
ship list management.
1 Introduction
Agreement on the membership of a group of processes in a distributed system is a basic problem that arises
in a wide range of applications. Such groups occur when a set of processes co-operate to perform some task,
share memory, monitor one another, subdivide a computation, and so forth. These problems are seen in
data base contexts [2], real-time settings [7], and distributed control applications [14] [3]. A process group's
membership may change when its processes fail (they are removed), recover (re-instated), when new processes
join, or when members voluntarily leave. Some form of consensus on group membership is necessary, for
without it a server that respects its specification may nonetheless behave inconsistently with some other
server that has simply seen different group members. Cristian [8], specified and solved a similar problem for
synchronous settings. This paper explores the problem in an asynchronous environment.
In our model of computation, a set of processes communicate through a completely connected network
of reliable, FIFO channels. Processes only fail by crashing, and once failed, do not recover. We model
process recovery by treating 'recovered' processes as new and different process instances. The system is fully
asynchronous in that message delivery times are unbounded and there is no global clock.
Accurate detection of crashes (and recoveries) is impossible in an asynchronous environment. At best,
a process can be suspected of having failed, but no process can ever be known to have crashed because real
crashes are indistinguishable from communication delays. We therefore focus on what it means for a process
to be a member of the group of operational processes in an asynchronous system. We model the presumed
failure of a process by removing it from the group. The impossibility of detecting crashes also affects the
meaning of correct process, for in the traditional literature a correct process is one that has not failed. In
our setting, it is one that has not been perceived to have failed [. Our goal is to make this mechanism mimic
a fail-stop failure detector.
Our approach and solution differ from previous work on group membership for asynchronous systems.
In contrast to Moser, et.al. [16], we do not assume the existence of an underlying fault-tolerant atomic
broadcast. Our solution is also cheaper than theirs, and the one proposed by Mishra, et.al. [15]. The
protocol in Birman and Joseph [4] blocks during periods when failures and recoveries occur continuously.
Our solution is fully 'online' : we can process a constant flow of requests to both remove and add processes.
which is exactly what occurs in actual systems. Bruso's solution [5] is symmetric (i.e. all processes behave
identically) and requires an order of magnitude more messages in all situations. Other, less directly related
protocols include [61_ and [91.
In Section 2 we discuss perceived failures in more detail and formally define the Group Membership
Problem. We discuss why, despite its similarity to Distributed Consensus [10], GMP is solvable. In Sections 3
and 4 we construct our solution, initially considering failures but not recoveries. Section 5 proves the
reconfiguration algorithm correct and provides crucial lemmas for correctness of the complete algorithm.
which is shown in Section 6. We also discuss the protocol's complexity and minimality. In Section 7 we
modify the original algorithm to allow processes to join the group. This yields a fully 'online' protocol in
the sense that we can now process a constant flow of requests to both exclude and join processes, which is
what occurs in actual systems. We conclude by discussing the implications of our particular specification.
and directions for future work.
[ If no other process attempts to interact with one that has, in fact, crashed, it will never be perceived to have failed
2 Marzullo [I 3] has shown that the G MP protocol in [6] needs extension if failures or recoveries occur during the second phase
of their "ring-reformation" protocol.
2 Perceived Failures
The notionof perceivedfailureiscrucialto GMP inasynchronous environments. In thissectionwe introduce
our model and discussperceived failuresindetail.We alsodiscusshow they affectGMP solutionsand tile
meaning of correct process.
2.1 The System Model
Our system is of a set of n processes, Proc, communicating through complete set of reliable (lossless and
non-generating), FIFO channels. There are no bounds on message transmission times, and no global clocks.
A process history, for a process p EProc, is a sequence of events including send events, receive events and
specific internal events that arise in our algorithm. General internal computation is not modeled. We use
send(p,q,m) to denote the sending of message m by process p to process q, and recv(p, q,m) to denote q's
reception of m from p. A history for p is denoted
=stortp, d" k> 0
where the e_ are events, and star_ is a unique, internal event. Denote by hp[i] the i th event of hp, and by
lhp[ the number of events of hp.
A system run is an n-tuple of process histories, one for each p_ EProc. We say an event, e, is in run
r =(hpL,hp_ ..... hp,), ife is an event in some process history, and denote this by e E r.
Causality between events (denoted -- and read happens before) in a given run is defined in the usual
manner after Lamport [12]. In our model, a consistent cut, c, is a system run closed under ---, ; that is, if
e -- e' and e' E c, then e E c.
I I I
Definition Given two process histories, hp and hp, we say hp is a prefiz of hp if and only if Ihpt<_lhp] and
• s . s I r
V0 < i _<[hp[.(hp[_]=hp[_]). hp is a strict prefiz of hp if and only if [hp]<thp[ and hp is a prefix of hp.
i # t
Definition Given two consistent cuts, c =(hi,h2 ..... hn) and c' =(hx, h2, .... h,_), in the same system
run,
r
1. c < d if and only if each hp is a prefix of hp;
s
2. c << c' if and only if each hp is a strict prefix of hp.
We model the crash failure of process p by a final event quitp a. In this way, once p has crashed, it causally
influences no other process. The proposition down(p) holds along a consistent cut c exactly when quitvE c.
We define u_p) =_ -,down(p). Finally, we define HP(c)C_Pry¢,flo be=a!! p_roce'_ses p for which up(p) holds
along consistent cut e, and DOIWA/'(c) to be Proc-//P(c). Asynchrony prevents processes from ever knowiug
the exact compo6ition of/4"P(e) (except along the initial cut, co = (startt ..... start,_)).
Perceived process failures may be triggered by a variety of phenomena. Complicating any algorithm for
detecting failures is the possibility that a transient event could prevent a live process from sending or receiving
messages, giving rise to spurious failure 'detections'. In such a situation one process might detect an apparent
failure when another does not, simply by virtue of observing during a period of degraded performance. Any'
SWhether a process actually executes this event is irrelevant (a process may be in an infinite loop); quitp is a convenience in
modelling a process that permanently ce_es communication with all others.
global characterization of a process as operational or failed will therefore require a distributed consensus
protocol 4. For brevity, we discuss only process failures, but there are analogous statements for 'recoveries'.
To model this, we treat failure detections as a form of input: the event faultyp(q) marks the point in
p's execution when it decides that q is faulty. The proposition 5 faultyp(q) is true along a consistent cut, c,
exactly when faultyp(q)E c. The possible sources of an event faultyp(q) are the following:
F1 : (Observation) For whatever reason, process p determines that q has
crashed. We are not concerned with the details of the mechanism used
here, but for liveness, we do assume that it occurs in finite time after a real
crash.
For example, p may be expecting a message from q and does not receive it within a pre-determined
"time-out' period (Note that we are using 'time' only as an (approximate) tool for detecting possible crash
failures. Nowhere do we use time to reason about system state.).
F2 : (Gossip) Process p receives a message m from some process, r, such
that faultyr(q) -- send(r,p,m) and, when p executes recv(r,p,m), it does
not believe q faulty.
In both cases, p executes the event faultyp(q). Let O,<>, [:=1,and _ (henceforth, at some future point,
always in the past, and some point in the past) be tense logic modalities (See [18] for rigorous definitions).
We also require :
Sl : (Isolation) Once a processes, p, believes another, q, to be faulty, p
never receives messages from q again.
faultyp(q) _ O--,(recv(q,p,m))
Our protocol is such that some time after recording faultyl,(q), p will execute the event removep(q). We
define the membership view for operational process p along cut c =(hi,h2 ..... hn), (denoted Memb(p. c)).
to be the set p obtains by sequentially modifying its initial membership list accdrding to the removep(q)
events in hp. Trivially, we require p EMemb(p, c). Memb(p, c) is undefined if down(p) holds along c. Because
hp is linear,'it makes sense to talk about the z th version of p's local view, which we denote Memb_. The
reader should notice that we distinguish between the events faultyt,(q ) and removep(q). This is because we
will require processes to coordinate updates to their local views. A process's initial, local decision about
another's faultiness must be propagated to all cohorts before removal can take place.
We extend local views to system views as follows.
Definition Given a consistent cut c and a set of processes, S C_ Proc :
$Sys(c, S) = Memb(p, c)
undefined
S n U'P(c) = 0
Vp, q e S n H'P(c).(Memb(p, c) = Memb(q, c))
otherwise
We say that S is the set of processes that determine the system view.
4 This is nat Distributed Consensus as defined in [10].
5 [n general, we write events in italics, and propositions in slanted type.
2.2 Relating Sys(c,S) to Failure Detection
As the definition of Sys(c, S) is crucial to our Group Membership Problem, it is worthwhile discussing some
subtle points. Intuitively, Sys(e, S) models tlle set of processes that the members of S believe operational
along consist cut c. During periods of quiescence, we will want Sys(c, S) = S. During periods of activity, we
will be particularly interested in how the sets S and Sys(e, S) relate.
Assume Sys(c, S) is defined and suppose q is not a member of the group whose local views determine the
system view; i.e.,q E -S. Then Memb(q, c) need not be identical to other processes' local views for the system
view to exist. Our concern lies with q taking an external action that reflects an incorrect composition of the
system view. If q is truly failed this is impossible. So consider q E (S'nhc'P(c)). Two cases are of particular
interest.
I.
.
q E ('S N liP(c) n Sys(c, S)). In words, q is functioning, but is a member of neither the system view
nor the group determining the system view. Given our intuition that Sys(c, S) is the set of processes
mutually believing each other to be operational, communication should remain within this group.
However, as q is operational along c, it may try to send messages to those in Sys(c, S). To effect our
intuition, via system property S1, we would like a rule of the form q _Memb(p,c) =_ faultyp(q), which
would inhibit p from receiving messages from any q not in its local view. This prevents a process not
in the system view from influencing those in it.
q E (S f3 U_O(c) N Sys(c, S)). In words, q is a functional member of the system view but not a member
of the group determining the system view. As q ¢ S, its local view may contradict the system view, and
this, given our interpretation of Sys(c, S), represents an inconsistency in the system state. Our goal is to
avoid the danger of this occurring. We would, therefore, like a rule requiring q to be in S whenever it is
in Sys(c, S); (Sys(c, S)n/c"P(c)) C_ (SN/_T_(c)). It is easy to see that ($oU1_(c)) C_(Sys(c, S)ol41:'(c)).
Thus, we will require S - Sys(c, S).
2.3 Problem Description : The Group Membership Problem
We proceed to a formal definition of the Group Membership Problem (GMP) as it relates to failure detection
in asynchronous systems. This consists of defining a safe and live distributed algorithm whereby processes
may query Memb(p, c) during execution, and such that operational processes observe "l-copy" behavior on
the sequence of views so-obtained (i.e. all see the same sequence of view transitions). Because responses to
queries on Memb(p, c) will be taken as reflecting an exact system view composition, we will want to ensure
that processes see identical sequences of view transitions. Failed processes will see only a prefix of all view
transitions, but their local views when they are operational must not be permitted to diverge.
Since, in our model, logical formulas are true along consistent cuts, we omit explicit reference to particular
cuts in the formulas. For example, the logical formula q E Memb(p) is true along only those consistent cuts
c for which q EMemb(p,c). We define the proposition out(p) to hold along all consistent cuts c for which
p _Sys(e, S), and in(p) to hold when p ESys(e, S).
An algorithm solves asynchronous GMP if each of the following properties are satisfied :
GMP-0 The initial system _,iew, Sys ° , exists along the initial cut; Proc=Sys(co, Proc).
GMP-1 A process does not remove another process from its local view capriciously;
q _Memb(p) _ faultyp(q).
GMP-2 In every system run there exists a unique (denoted 3 !) sequence of system views upon
which the functional members of each view agree;
vr. 3 ! Views(r) = {(co, So),..., (ok, Sk) I (0 _ k) A (c_ << c_+1) A Svs(c_, S_) = S_}
Because the cuts are non-intersecting and unique, it makes sense to talk about the z _h version
of the system view, which we denote gys t .
GMP-3 All processes see the same sequence of local views, provided the views are defined;
Vp, q.(V0 _< x.(Memb_ = Mernb_)). This is equivalent to requiring each local view to eventually
become a system view.
GMP-4 Processes are never re-instated to local views; q ¢ Memb(p) = [::l(q _ Memb(p))
GMP-5 For each event faultyp(q), and p Egys _ , eventually either p or q is removed from the system
view; faultyp(q) ::_ (O(out(q)) V O(out(p))).
A few points are of note here. First, because our detection mechanism operates in finite time, a crash
failure will be detected by any process dependent upon the failed one. GMP-1 and property S1 isolate faulty
processes.
Second, notice that "failure detections' by "faulty' processes are finessed by these conditions. On the one
hand, property GMP-5 forces processes, and therefore the system, to react to failure detections. This, also
rules out the trivial solution. On the other hand, SI causes messages from suspected faulty processes to be
ignored (actually discarded), implying that if a process p makes a detection fa_dtyp(q) and some other process
concurrently believes p to have failed, it may be that no operational process will learn of p's detection. If
the detection was erroneous and q is operational, the event faaltyp(q) may or may not trigger q's eventual
exclusion. The outcome will depend on the pattern of communication that ensues.
Finally, observe that, as an artifact of GMP-I, there is an implied composition of the various system
views. Specifically, given c_, and q ESys _- 1 , if for no process p E Sys _- 1 does faultyp(q) hold along cx then
q must be in 5ys z . Thus, we have captured the intuitive notion that system views represent processes that
are mutually believed operational.
2.4 Difference Between GMP and Distributed Consensus
Our safety and liveness properties both define GMP as well as distinguish it from Distributed Consensus
(DC) [10]. Though it appears very similar to GMP. DC is strictly stronger.
In DC, at least one process must reach a decision on a bit value. This decision is final. Moreover, all
processes reaching decisions in a given run must choose the same value. Finally, both outcomes are possible.
ruling out the trivial solution.
Since processes are required to reach the same decision, once a process reaches a decision, all other
processes must eventually have knowledge of that decision value (else they could decide the other). This i_
exactlyHalpern and Moses's eventual knowledge [11], and, by the induction rules for eventual knowledge,
DC would attain Eventual Common Knowledge. Halpern and Moses prove that, when communication is not
guaranteed, Eventual Common Knowledge, and therefore DC, can not be attained.
GMP, on the other hand, is phrased in terms of Concurrent Knowledge, which is knowledge achieved along
a consistent cut [17]. Concurrent Knowledge is weaker that Eventual Knowledge, but, we believe, appropriate
for asynchronous systems. Moreover, GMP is not required to attain concurrent common knowledge s. The
Appendix of this paper contains a detailed epistemic analysis of GMP. Finally, GMP uses a modified notion
of correct process, allowing us to discount some processes that may not, in reality, be crashed. For these
reasons, the impossibility result does not apply to our work.
3 Solution
Our solution to GMP will make use of two channel properties, one of which is not immediate from the model.
First, we require channels to be FIFO, and second, we require that there be no messages from future views.
Both of these properties are easily implemented : the former requires a (1-bit) sequence number on each
naessage and an acknowledgement protocol; the latter involves adding view numbers to messages so that
they can be delayed when received from a process in a future view (i.e. until that view is installed locally).
3.1 The Basic Algorithm - MgrDoes Not Fail
Our solution to the Group Membership Problem isasymmetric : itinvolvesa distinctprocess,denoted
Mgr, responsibleforcoordinatingupdates to the outer processes'localviews. We use a two.phase protocol
when Mgrco-ordinates localupdates, and a three-phaseprotocol to selecta new co-ordinatorand stabilize
the system when Mgr isperceivedto have failed.To introduce the structure,we initiallyassume Mgr does
not fail.We alsomodify the localviews only by deletingprocessidentifiersfrom it.Mgr's failureand join
operationsare considered later.
In accordance with GMP-5, when a processp executesthe event faultyp(q),itsends a message toMgr, re-
questing that itstartthe removal algorithm. Every process,upon notingfaulty.(q),disconnectsitsincoming
communication channel from q,thereby satisfying$I.
Mgr initiatesthe two-phase update algorithm when itbecomes aware of a failure.In Phase I (Figure l)
Mgr broadcasts a removal invitationmessage, Exclude(q),and awaits the outer processes'responsesor noti-
ficationof theirfailure.In thisway, at the end of Phase I,allnon-faultyprocesses(from Mgr's perspective)
believefaulty(q).In Phase II,Mgr broadcastsa removal commit message, Commit(q), tellingprocessesthat
(weak) consensus on q'sfailurehas been reached and they can remove q from theirlocalviews. Processes
Mgr believesfaultywillnot participatein the update algorithms. Thus, the agreement on a new system
view becomes contingentupon the subsequent removal of theseprocesses.System property F2 ensures that
operationalouter processesbecome aware of such contingencies.Because Mgr isa singleprocess,the outer
processes'localviews at the end ofeach invocationof the two-phase algorithm are identical.
Observe that the invitationmessage, Exclude(q),isunnecessary(with respectto GMP-I) ifMgr knows the
outer processesalreadybelieveq faulty.In thisway',the contingentupdates, piggy-backed upon a commit
message, serve as an invitationfor subsequent view changes. We can thus compress successiverounds if
6GMP neednotevenattaineventual concurrentcommon knowledge,definedanalogouslytoC°.
Mgr
Phase I Phase II
 .IIIII -_
x =la.tty.(q)
Figure 1: Structure of the Two-Phase Protocol
Mgr makes known, when it issues the Phase II broadcast for the current change, how it plans to change tile
system view next.
Conventions and Notation
We use different type styles in writing different objects. Events are written in emphasized type (quitp,
faultyp(q)), and variables are in sans serif type (Mgr, Faulty(p), Chp ). Program key words are in bold face
type (begin, await), and formulas of the logic are in slanted type (up(p), [aultyp(q)).
We will also adopt conventions in the figures that follow. Process histories are represented by horizontal
rays. A solid (diagonal) ray between two process histories represents a message from the ray's source to its
sink. Dashed rays indicate messages whose existence is hypothetical, in the sense that no direct information
is available to indicate whether this message was sent. A solid line emanating from one process history and
terminating without reaching another history represents a message that cannot be received due to system
property S1. A set of nlessages grouped at the sender with an open circle represents a broadcast, as defined
below. Message contents, when necessary, will be indicated in text near the ray's source. We will al._o
indicate particular events or points of note in processes' executions as needed.
Let Mernb°=Proc, for all p and all runs. We use Memb(p) to denote p's current local view, when a cut is
clear from context.
Given send(p, q,m), let Bcast(p,G,m) be the action Vq EG.(send(p, q,m)) where G is a set of processc_.
Bcast(p.G,m) is an indivisible action in the sense that p does not execute any other events until all message._
are sent, but it is not failure-atomic.
Faulty(p) is a set of processes, local to p, which p believes faulty but has not yet removed from Memb(p!.
Chp is the set of channel id's connected to process p. The channel (p, q) is in the direction from p to q.
At startup, we assume the initial group membership, Proc, is commonly-known. We also assume that rh,,
event faultyp(q) triggers the appropriate actions regarding Faulty(p), as well as disconnecting the incomin_
channel (p, q).
Msr
Begin :
while true do
begin
await (Faulty(Mgr) # 0);
proc-id -- delete (Faulty( Mgr ));
while (proc-id# nil-id) do
begin
Bcast(Mgr ,Memb(Mgr ),Exclude(proc-id));
X.1 Vp E Memb(Mgr).(awalt (OK(p) or faultYMg r (p)));
reraoveMg r (proc-id);
Get Next( next-id ) ;
Bcast(Mgr ,Memb(Mgr ),Commit(proc-id): Contingent(next-id:Faulty(Mgr )));
proc-id .- next-id;
end ;
end ;
End.
Outer Processes
Begin :
reet_Mgr, p, Exclude(proc-id))
if p = proc-id then quilT,.
faultyr(proc-id);
X.2 repeat selld(p, Mgr,OK(p))
await (Commit(proc-id):Contingent (next-id:L));
if (p E L) or (p =next-id) then quitp.
faultyp(nexbid);
vl e L.(/a.:typ(t));
[note: fauityp(nil-id) is a null operation]
mmovep(pro¢-id);
Faulty(p) .- Faulty(p) - {proc-id};
proc-id -- next-id;
until (proc-id=nil-id);
End.
Figure 2: Exclusion Algorithm
Mgr
P
Commit(q)
\
\
Sys_
quitMgr
II
) Memb_ +1
Memb_
r
Figure 3: Inconsistent System
Remarks
This protocolcan tolerate[Memb(Mgr)l-I failures.We willsee that fault-tolerancedecreasesappreciably
when Mgrcan fail;only a minority of failurescan be toleratedbetween successivesystem views.
4 Reconfiguring - Allowing Mgrto Fail
In this section we present a reconfiguration algorithm that selects a new co-ordinator (new Mgr ) and stabilizes
the system when Mgr is perceived to fail.
If Mgr fails in the middle of an update commit broadcast no system view will exist (see Figure 3). To
re-establish the system view, our reconfiguration algorithm must address two problems : succession - which
process(es) should initiate the reconfiguration algorithm and which should assume the Mgr role at the end:
progression - which system view should a reconfiguration initiator propose to resolve inconsistencies and
maintain safety.
Intuitively, reconfiguration depends on an initiator's ability to determine the last defined system view and
propagate the correct proposal for the succeeding system view. [n our algorithm, all successful reconfigurers
(those able to reach the commit phase), undertaking reconfiguration of the zth system view, determine
identical proposals.
GMP-2 requires system views to be unique. This forces any initiator to obtain responses from a majority
of processes in its local view. An initiator can fail to obtain a majority in three ways : the initiator, itself.
may be faulty, the network may be partitioned, or a majority of processes may be faulty. In the last instance.
no algorithm can make progress Unless some recoveries occur.
GMP-3 forces us to account for invisible commits. These occur when the only processes receiving a
commit message fail. While no subsequent reconfiguration initiator will ever know whether any commil
messages were sent, if an invisible commit did occur, the system must behave in a manner consistent with
that event. This is the most difficult aspect of reconfiguration, as it is imperative that every invisibly
committed update be detectable by every successful reconfigurer. We can ensure this only if the degree of
system-wide inconsistency is tightly-enough bounded so that any initiator obtaining a majority of respons_'._
in the interrogation phase can infer the composition of local views of processes not responding to it. That
is, local views must not be permitted to diverge so far that majority subsets might not intersect r.
rThisisalsorelevanttoGMP-2, forensuringuniquesystemviewsrequiresatmostoneinitiatortobeabletoobtainresponse.
froma majorityofprocessesinitslocalview,
In our algorithm, all successful reconfigurers attempting to install s the xth system view propagate Mgr's
proposal, if they become aware of it, and if not, propose Mgr's removal. Unfortunately, asynchrony and
inopportune failures can result in there being two different proposals for the same instance of the system
view. We prove only one of them could possibly have reached the commit stage (we call such a proposal
stably.defined), and then that any reconfigurer can determine which one it is. By propagating the stably-
defned proposal, a reconfigurer forces the system to act consistently with any possible invisible commits.
Moreover, we ensure that all stably-defined proposals for the same version number are identical, further
ensuring GMP-3 as no process commits a local view for version x that differs from another process's version
4.1 Structure of the Reconfiguration Algorithm
Unlike the exclusion algorithm, the reconfiguration algorithm requires three phases. This is interesting and
important, though not surprising in light of Skeen's work on non-blocking commit protocols [20]. In the
first phase, the initiator broadcasts a reconfiguration interrogation message to all processes in its local view
and awaits their responses 9'l°. If a majority respond, the initiator determines an update event, based on
the outer processes' local states, whose execution would restore the system view. The initiator broadcasts
this event as the reconfiguration proposal message tl. After receiving another majority response, the initiator
broadcasts a reconfiguration commit message. Majority responses are essential in maintaining GMP-2 and
GMP-3; without it, the initiator must block.
4.2 Rules of Succession
We solve the succession problem by assuming a deterministic, linear ranking on process identifiers, with
Mgr the highest-ranked process t2. We say p has higher rank than q if rank(p)>rank(q). Whenever a process
is removed from a view, the ranks of all lower-ranked processes are increased by one. The rank of an excluded
process is undefined. Thus, in the x ta system view, rank(Mgr )=]5ys _ [, and rank(p)= 1 if p is lowest-ranked
process. Observe that while p and q are in the same system views, their ranking relative to each other will
not change.
A process initiates reconfiguration when it believes all those ranked higher thah itself are faulty. That
is, given cut c and Memb(p, c)
initiate(p) = A ((rank(q) > rank(p)) A faultyp(q))
qe Mere b(p, c)
While this could lead to multiple, concurrent reconfiguration initiations, it guarantees that at least one
process will begin the reconfiguration algorithm. Consider Table I in which rank(Mgr )= z, rank(p)- x - 1.
and rank(q)= z - 2, and both p and q believe Mgr to be faulty. In the third scenario, both processes initiate
reconfigurations. Section 4.3 discusses how multiple, concurrent reconfiguration attempts could affect view
Sor complete the installation of
More precisely, it awaits their responses or executes ]nutty().
t°Observe that it will be necessary to over-ride the message buffering mechanism to be able to recortfigure from a version-
inconsistent state. We therefore assume that neither interrogation nor responses nor commit messages will be buffered.
t t The proposal may be a sequence of events. Its size is a function of the current size of the system view and must guarantee
that majority subsets of Memb(r) and Memb(r)-(Proposals} intersect. Section 5 explains this necessity in more detail.
t-_ Process rank is, in fact, based on 'seniority' with respect to duration in the system view
lO
p actual state
Up
Failed
Up
Failed
q thinks p
Up
Up
Failed
Failed
q initiates?
No
Eventually
Yes
Yes
p initiates?
Yes
No
Yes
No
Table 1: Multiple Reconfiguration Initiations
uniqueness. In the second scenario, q expects p to initiate a reconfiguration. Eventually, q will _time-out"
on p, surmising faultyq(p), and initiate the reconfiguration.
To implement the initiation rule, each process, p, maintains a local list, HiFaulty(p) with maximum
size rank(p)-l, whose contents are the id-s of all higher-ranked processes, still members of Memb(p), that
p believes faulty. Processes in HiFautty(p) are removed from it upon their removal from Memb(p), and
HiFaulty(p)'s maximum size is decreased by one.
HiFaulty(r) : A set local to process r, of size tMemb(r)l-rank(r ), updated as follows :
1. Upon noting faultyr(q) for q of higher rank than r, q is added to HiFaulty(r).
2. Upon removing q from Memb(r), q is removed from HiFaulty(r). The size of HiFaulty(r) is decreased
by 1.
4.3 Maintaining GMP-2 : Uniqueness of the Reconfiguration View
Recall that GMP-2 requires that the system view installed by reconfiguration (and removal) be unique.
Consider the following situation, depicted in Figure 4, in which Q and R are subsets of Pro¢:
1. faultyQ(r) _ rec_q, Q,Interrogate) _ recv(q, Q,Commit(RLq):Contingent(Fautty(q)) ) for each pro-
cess q' in Q
2. faultyR(q) -- recv(r, R,Interrogate) --- recv(r, R,Commit(RLr):Contingent(Faulty(r))) for each process
r' in R.
Inconsistency may arise since no process in Q will receive r's interrogation (Figure 4) and no process in R
will receive q's. Uniqueness of the system view would eventually be violated.
To prevent this and ensure that only one process (at a time) succeeds in installing a reconfiguration view,
we require any initiator to obtain responses from a majority of processes in its local view. Let
/IMemb(r'c)lj + 1. We will write #_. when c is understood.
• //r,c "-- L 2
• = + I;#= = + i.
Let PhaseIResp(r), for reconfigurationinitiatorr,be r together with the processes responding to its
interrogation,and Phase2Resp(r) be r and the processesresponding to itsproposal.Then r,beginning ill
local view Mernb_, can succeed in proposing a reconfiguration system view if and only if [PhaselResp(r)[> p_,
and can succeed in committing 13 the proposed view if and only if lPhase2Resp(r)[> #_. An initiator that is
[a To completely ensure that only one process succeeds in installing a view, we must also bound the size difference bet we,'n
two processes' local views; if not, then majorities need not intersect. We discuss this in more detail.
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Figure 4: Majority of Responses Needed
unable to obtain either majority will execute quit. An initiator can fail to obtain a majority in three ways :
tile initiator, itself, may be faulty, the network may be partitioned, or a majority of processes may be faulty.
In the last instance no algorithm can make progress unless some recoveries occur.
4.4 Maintaining GMP-3 : Propagating Committed Local Views
The content of outer processes' Phase I responses should allow the initiator to determine the nature and
composition of any version-inconsistency. While local view information suffices to detect inconsistencies
between the processes responding to an initiator, it falls short of satisfying GMP-3 entirely as invisible
commlts are not detectable.
To communicate its local view, a process responds with the sequence of remove() events it has executed.
which we denote by seq(p) for process p. To aid in detecting invisible commits, each process maintains a list
of triples, next(p), indicating how it expects to change its local view next. For example, the triple (-p_ : r : x)
means p is expecting a commit message from r, ordering pr's removal from Memb(p), and resulting in the
x 'h system view. Let ver(p)= z hold along all consistent cuts, c, for which Memb(p, c)=Memb_ and define
next(p) as follows :
• next(p) .-- (-q:Mgr :x) once p responds to recl,_Mgr, p,Invite(q)) and ver(Mgr )=vet(p)= x - 1.
• next(p) .- (-next-id:Mgr :z) once p responds to a removal commit message Commit((proc-id):(next-
id:Faulty(Mgr))) and ver(Mgr) = ver(p)= z - I. If next-id [s the nil-id, next(p) is simply (0 : Mgr : z).
• let ,V" = next(p). Then next(p) +---(AF,(? : r :?)), once p responds to recv(r,p,Interrogate).
• let (,V'.(?:r :?)) - next(p). Then next(p) *--- (-RI._ : r : x) once p responds to recv(r,p, Propose(RL,:x)).
It is not hard to see that when p receives r's proposal message, the last element of next(p) must be
(? : r :?).
• Otherwise, p is not awaiting any commit or proposal message, and next(p) is empty.
=
When ver(p)- x, the succession rule and $1 mean next(p) is the proposal of the lowest-ranked among all
processes from which p receives proposals for version z + l.
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Givena proposal, 7r = (p_ : r : x), of next(p) we use lst(_r) to obtain Pr, 2ndOr) to obtain r, and 3rd(,'r)
to obtain x.
Definition Let r be a reconfiguration initiator. Then _" = (z : p : v) is committed invisibly to r if and only
if 3q' _ PhaselResp(r).(: E seq(q'))^ Vq E PhaselResp(r).(z (_ seq(q)).
4.5 The Reconfiguration Algorithm
Note that while HiFaulty(p) is local to each process p, rank is commonly known. Consequently, other processes
can infer the contents of HiFaulty(p) in the event that p initiates a reconfiguration. The variable "invis' refers
to the frst process r will remove after successfully reconfiguring the system. ProposalsForVer(x,r) is a set,
local to reconfigurer r, of the processes that r's Phase I respondents expected to remove to obtain local
version z :
ProposalsForVer(z,r) - {z ] 3q E PhaselResp(r).(3p.((z : p: z) E next(q)))}.
GMP-2 and GMP-3 require us to prove that each reconfigurer knows exactly which of the processes in
ProposalsForVer(x,r) could have committed invisibly.
Once the reconfiguration algorithm completes, r and the outer processes can begin the exclusion algo-
rithm. If invis is defined, they can begin at the appropriate points in the compressed removal algorithm (line
X.1 for r, and line X.2 for the outer processes). Observe that Mgr must henceforth garner responses from
a majority of processes before it can commit any removals. We present the final Mgr algorithm when we
consider the join operation.
5 Correctness of the Reconfiguration Algorithm
Our goal is to show that all successful initiators (Mgror reconfigurers able to reach the commit phase)
determine identical proposals. To do this, will prove that every invisibly committed removal is detectable
by every successful reconfigurer. We first show tliat local views do not diverge so far that majorities need
not intersect 14. To do this, we quantify the possible difference between an initiator's local view and its
respondents' by showing
Vq E PhaselResp(r).(ver(r)- I <:ver(q)<:vet(r)-Jri).
We will also show that no non-faulty process receives proposals that would force it to skip a version number.
thereby guaranteeing a sort of cohesion among the responses an initiator receives to its interrogation :
max 3rd(,'r) = ver(q) + I.
,¢next(q)
Given r, a reconfiguration initiator, PhaselResp(r). a majority subset of Memb(r), q EPhaselResp(r).
and 7r = (: : p : e), an element of next(q), we next show that p cannot succeed in committing any view
numbered more than v, and that v < ver(r) + 2. In this way, any proposal that has a chance of being
committed (i.e. one whose initiator receives majority approval) will be known to all subsequent initiators
t4This is also relevant to GMP-2, for ensuring unique system views requires at most one initiator to be able to obtain respons,-q
from a majority of processes in its local view.
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Initiator, r
[note: Upon full (HiFault_(r)) Begin Phase I - Interrogation]
B cast( r ,Memb ( r ) ,Interrogate )
Vp eMemb(r), await (OK(seq(p),next(p))or [aultyr(p));
if fewer than #, OKs then quit_.
[note: Begin Phase II - Proposal];
Determine(RL,, invis, v);
Bcast(r,Memb(r),((RLr:r: v):(invis ,Faulty(r))));
Vp EMemb(r).(await (OK(p) or faultyr(p)));
if fewer than #, OKs then qui_.
[note: Begin Phase III- Commit]
remove_(RL_);
Bcast( r ,Memb( r ),Commit( Rl _ ):(invls ,Faulty(r)});
seq(r) -- (seq(r),RL,);
ver(r) _-- ver(r)+l;
begin Mgrrole by removing invis.
Outer Processes, p
rector, p, lnterrogate);
if rank(p)<rank(r) then qui_.
send(p, r, OK(seq(p),n_t(p)));
Vq EHiFaulty(r).(faultyp(q) );
next(p) -- (next(p), (? : r :?));
await (Propose((proc-id : r:vr):(next-id,F))or faulty_(r));
if faultyp(r) then exit the protocol.
if (pE F) then quitp.
send(p, r,OK(p));
Vq e F.(fanltyp(q));
next(p) -- (proe-id : r : vr);
await (Commit((proc-id : r : vr):(next-id,F')) or faultyp(r));
if faultyp(r) then exit the protocol.
R.1 if (p E F') then qnitp.
R.2 if or _- vet(p)
then remov%(proc-id);
ver(p) -- vet(p)+ 1;
seq(p) .-- (seq(p),proc-id);
next(p) -- (next-id:r : vet(p) + 1);
Vq E F'.(fauityp(q));
Mgr -- r,
Figure 5: Reconfiguration Algorithm
I4
[note:Determine(RLr,invis, v) : determines a reconfiguration proposal for initiator r]
Begin '
L - (l Iver(l}= v,r(,) + I};
S "- {s I ver(s) = ver(r) - 1};
ease L # * [.note: incomplete installation of version ver(L)]
begin
v _- ver(L);
D.0 RLr ,- (seq(L)-seq(r));
O.1 case iProposalsForVer(v+l)l = 0 then GetNext(invis );
D.2 IProposalsForVer(v+i)l = I then invis -- ProposalsForVer(v+l);
D.3 else invis -- GetStable(r, v);
end
L = 0 h S # 0 [note: incomplete installation of version ver(r)]
begin
v _ ver(r);
RLr -- (seq(r)-seq($));
case IProposalsForVer(v+l)l= 0then GetNext(invls);
]ProposalsForVer(v+l)l = 1 then invis *-- ProposalsForVer(v+l);
else invis -- GetStable(r,v);
end
L=S=¢
begin v *-- ver(r)+l;
D.4 case IProposalsForVer(v+l)l = 0 then RL, -- Mgr;
D.5 IProposalsForVer(v+ 1)1 = 1 then RL, -- ProposalsForVer(v+l);
D.6 else RL_ -- GetStable(r, _,);
GetNext(invis );
end
End.
i
[note'. GetStable(r, vet) : determines the one process in ProposalsForVer(ver,r)]
[note." whose removal could have been committed invisibly to r]
Begin :
Proposers, _-- {p ] 3q E PhaselResp(r), :r E ProposalsForVer(ver).((zp : p : vet) E next(q))}:
let p E Prr such that (Vp _ EProposers_.(rank(p)<rank(p')));
[note: i.e. p is the lowest-ranked process to have proposed version ver]
let 7rp such that Irp = (zp : p: vet);
GetStable *--- zr ;
End.
Figure 6: Procedures Determine(RL,, invis, v) and GetStable(r, vet) of Reconfiguration
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reaching the commit phase; we will have ensured that, until a reconfiguration completes, majority subsets
of local versions must intersect.
To show correctness with respect to GMP-2 and GMP-3 entirely, we will also need to show that in each
of tile sets of r-detectable proposals for version 2, ProposalsForVer(z,r), there is at most one process whose
removal may have been committed invisibly to r, and that r can determine which process it is. In particular
we first show
• Vr.lProposalsForVer(x,r) j _ 2, and
• (IProposalsForVer(x,r)l = 2 A JProposalsForVer(x,r')l = 2) =_
ProposalsForVer(x,r) = ProposalsForVer(z,r').
The major work is in showing that only one of the two r-detectable proposals could have been committed.
and that 1"can determine which of the two it is. From these facts a weakened version of the safety conditions
follows :
Vp, q E PhaselResp(r).(ver(p) = vet(q) ¢_, seq(p) = seq(q)) t)
In what follows, let L be the subset of PhaselResp(r) reporting the longest sequence or remove events,
and S be the subset with the shortest sequence. Let "?x" denote the invitation (if removal) or interroga-
tion/proposal (if reconfiguration) messages for the x th intended system view, Sys z , and "!x" denote the
commit message (whether removal or reconfiguration) for Sys z .
Proposition 5.1 fir is a reconfiguration initiator then
Vq E PhaselResp(r).(ver(r) - 1 _<ver(q) <_vet(r) + 1).
Proof Let ver(r)- x and p be the process responsible for r installing Memb_. While Sys _"may not be
fully defined, r has installed it locally. Suppose that some s EPhaselResp(r) has ver(s)< x - 1. Then s has
neither received nor responded to p's "?x', so p believes faultyr(s ). Upon receipt of p's commit message.
"!x', r also believes faulty_(s) and wilt receive no further messages from s.
On the other hand, suppose some ! EPhaselResp(r) responds with vet(l)> x + 1, and let p_ be responsible
for installing vet(l). Because vet(r)- z, r has neither received nor responded to p"s "?vet(I)", resulting in
faulty_,,(r), and, upon l's receipt of "!vet(i)", faultyl(r). In such a situation, l would not receive or respond
to r's interrogation. •
Definition Given process p, Sys z is p-defined (along consistent cut c) if
A (Kpver(q) > x) V (?aultyp(q)).
q_Memb(p)
(2)
That is, from the point of view of process p, Sys _ is (or has been) defined. Of course, Sys z may not be
technically defined as some process q, which p believes faulty, may have vet(q)< z and still be functioning.
With respect to a reconfiguration initiator, r, 5ys z is r-defined when every process in PhaselR_p(r) reports.
in Phase I, a version number at least as large as x. At the end of Phase I, r believes all those in PhaselResp( r}
faulty.
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Figure 7: Bounding Invisible Commits
Proposition 5.2 Let i" be a reconfiguration initiator. Then r proposes version z only i/Sys z-I is the last
r.defined system view (once r has finished Phase f).
Proof With reference to procedure Determine,
• When L # #, r proposes version number ver(L)= vet(r) + 1, and while it may also be the case that
S _: 0, it is not difficult to see that faultyL($) holds resulting in faultyr(S) at the end of Phase I and
Sys vet(r) being r-defined there.
• When L = 0 A S _: 0, Sysver(S) is the last r-defined system view and r proposes version number
ver(r)=ver(S)+l.
• When L = ,5' = 0, Sys ver(r) is the last r-defined system view and r proposes version ver(r)+l.
Proposition 5.3 No non.faulty process receives a proposal that would force it to skip a local view :
Yq E PhaselResp(r).( max 3rd(r) = ver(q) + 1).
,Enext(q)
Proof Let ver(q)= x and suppose r proposes x = (: : r : z + 2) and r E next(q). Then it is not possible
for 7" to be the same co-ordinator as the one responsible for installing Mernb_ because the FIFO channel
assumption forces q to receive "?x + 1" before "!z + i" and "!z + 1" before "?z + 2". But then ver(q)= x + 1.
So suppose r is a reconfiguration initiator. Proposition 5.2 shows that r proposes version number _"+ '2
if and only if r detects Sys TM as the last r-defined system view. This, we have already noted, means
Vp E PhaselResp(r).(ver(p) > z+l). We surmise, then, that i' did not receive q's response to its interrogation.
In this case, q E Faulty(r), and upon receipt of r's proposal executes quitq (R.I) before it updates next(q).
The cohesion of Phase I responses is important in the next proposition.
If r is successful in obtaining a majority of responses from the processes in Mernbrz, Proposition 5. I tells
us that the largest version number observed among r's respondents is z + 1; thus, VI E L.(ver(l) < x + 1_.
So suppose ver(L)= z + 1. Then every I E L has responded to "?z+ 2_. Moreover, (all) processes ill
PhaselResp(r) may also have done so. It is possible that L and PhaselResp(r) together may suffice ,,,
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formtherequisite majority, pz+l, to commit version z + 2 (See Figure 7). Fortunately, we can bound the
divergence in the system by showing that if r has obtained responses from a majority of processes in Memb, _.
no other process can (concurrently) succeed in committing local versions numbered higher than _ + 2.
Proposition 5.4 Let r be a reconfiguration initiator and let £ C_PhaselResp(r) have the largest local version
number. Given 1 E L, let ;r = (z : p : v) E next(I). Then while p may succeed in committing the removal of
: invisibly to r. p cannot succeed in installing any view numbered greater than ver(I)+l.
Proof From Proposition 5.1 we know ver(r) < ver(l) < ver(r) + 1. Proposition 5.3 gives v _< ver(l) + [ =
ver(r) + 2. For the worst case, take v = ver(r) + 2. Then process p can succeed in committing view v + 1 if
and only if IPhaseiResp(r)- {:}] >_ /a_. Noting that Sys z =Memb,Z=(PhaselResp(r), PhaselResp(r)). that
z EPhaselResp(r), and that/a_ - I =/a_+2 for each x, then p succeeds if and only if
(] PhaselResp(r) - {:} 1>_/a_) 4¢, (I PhaselResp(r) I>_/av + 1)
¢_ (I PhaselResp(r) I>_ (/aver(r) - 1) + 1) =/aver(r).
But IPhaselResp(r)[_>/aver(r) is impossible. •
Recall the definition of the sets ProposalsForVer(z,r) :
ProposalsForVer(z,r) = {z ] 3q E PhaselResp(r).(3p.((z : p : z) E next(q)))}.
It remains to consider how r can determine which (one) of the elements in these sets could have been invisibly
committed. This is important in determining invis (when either L ¢: 0 or L = 0 ^ S _ O) and in determining
RL, (when L = S = 0).
To elucidate, suppose Sy, *-t is the last r-defined view. Intuitively, if 5ys z-I was committed with an
attendant proposal for Sys _ (i.e. the condensed algorithm applied), then ProposaisForVer(z.r)is that pro-
posal and IProposalsForVer(z,r)[= 1. However, it may be the case that, while there were no plans for future
removals when Mgr broadcast the commit message for Sys `-t , at some later time, Mgr began an exclusion
algorithm to form the z:th system view. If, during that same interval, a process had begun reconfiguration, it
is possible that it may not receive any Phase I responses indicating Mgr's plans for Sys _ . In such a case, this
reconfigurer would propose Mgr's removal for version z. A subsequent reconfigurer may then get responses
indicating both of these proposals.
We first describe the composition of ProposalsForVer(x,r), showing that every reconfigurer proposing
version z either propagates Mgr's proposal for version z or proposes Mgr's removal.
Proposition 5.5 Let r be a reconfiguration initiator proposing version z. Then,
Vz > 0.(I ProposalsForVer(z,r)IS 2).
Proof Suppose Mgr succeeded in inviting a majority of processes to install version z (that is, a majority
of Sys_-1 received _?x" from Mgr ). Let S denote the set of processes receiving =?x* from Mgr. Before any
reconflguration attempts take place, there is only one element in the general class, ProposalsForVer(z). Now.
the 'first' reconfigurer, rl, obtaining a majority of responses in Phase [is must have ]ProposalsForVer(z.rl)l= l
Is From the majority property, it is not difficult to see that "first', 'second' etc. are well-defined here.
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because PhaselResp(rL) must intersect S. From line D.S, rl propagates this. Similar reasoning tells us that
the proposal choices for the second, third, and so on, reconfigurers that complete Phase I are identical. In
this way, the only proposals made for version z propagate Mgr's proposal, and IProposaJsForVer(.c,r)[- 1 for
every r proposing version z.
So suppose the set S is not a majority of $ys x-l . Let r' be a reconfigurer for which PhaselResp(r')
is a majority, and suppose no process in PhaselResp(r') has heard of Mgr's proposal. Then r' proposes to
remove Mgr (line D.4 ). [n general, all reconfigurers not detecting Mgr's proposal (directly or by propagation)
propose to remove Mgr, and all reconfigurers detecting only Mgr's proposal propagate it. In this way, the
general class, ProposalsForVer(z), can contain two elements. The first reconfigurer to detect both these
proposals calls procedure Determine which chooses exactly one of them to propagate, thereby introducing
no further proposals. •
Corollary 5.1 Let r and r _ be reconfigurers proposing version x. Then
((I ProposalsForVer(.c,r)I= 2) A (I ProposalsForVer(z,r') J= .2)) :=_
ProposalsForVer('x,r) = ProposalsForVer(z,r').
Proof All reconfigurers either propagate Mgr's proposal for version z, which is unique, or propose Mgr's
removal. •
We now show that only one of the two proposals for a given version could possibly have been committed
(invisibly or otherwise), and that all reconfigurers can distinguish which of the two it was. This proposition
plays a crucial role in simplifying the full correctness proofs in the next section.
Proposition 5.6 Let r be a reconfiguration initiator. If [ProposalsForVer(z,r)_= 2, r can distinguish which
of the two proposals could not have been committed invisibly.
Proof Let r be the first process for which PhaselResp(r) is a majority of Memb(r) and such that
JProposalsForVer(a:,r)J=2. Let p and p' be such that (: : p : z) and (Mgr : p_ : z) are found in the responses
to r's interrogation. Without loss of generality, let rank(p)>rank(id) and consider the following cases :
1.
2,
p = Mgr. From the proof of Proposition 5.5, we know Mgr's proposal to remove z did not reach a
majority of Sys z- t , and Mgr could not have succeeded in committing z's removal.
p ¢ Mgr. Since p and id were both able to propose views, PhaselResp(p) and PhaselResp(p') must
intersect. If Phase2Resp(p) and PhaselResp(p') intersect then (z : p : ,r) is known to p' result-
ing in z E ProposalsForVer(z,id). By hypothesis, r is the first process to see both proposals, so
ProposalsForVer(z,ld)={z}. In this case p' is forced to propagate (z : p : z) (line D.5 ) and can,or
have proposed (Mgr : pl : z).
So it must be that Phase2Resp(p) and PhaselResp(p') do not intersect and r deduces that Phase2Resp(p)
could not have been a majority. It is therefore impossible for p to have committed z's removal invisibly
to r (and p').
An analogous argument applies when rank(p_)>rank(p)
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Proposition 5.6 shows that GetStable correctly chooses the only proposal for a given version number that
could have been invisibly committed.
On a side note_ if IProposalsForVer(z,r)l= I then propagating ProposaisForVer(z,r) is safe as no other
higher-ranked process can obtain the majority required to partially commit a different version x. For tile
same reasons, if lProposalsForVer(z,r)l= O, proposing Mgr's removal is also safe.
Definition A proposal is stably-defined if its initiator could possibly have reached the commit stage; that
is, given x = (." : p : z), if p = Mgr, then p obtained responses from a majority of processes in 5ys _-l , and
if p _ Mgr, then Phase2Resp(p) is a majority subset of Memb(p) and z - 1 _< ver(p) < x.
Stably-defined proposals are exactly the proposals that any reconfigurer must view as possibly committed
invisibly.
Corollary 5.2 All stably-defined proposals for the same version number are identical.
Proof Proposition 5.6 proves that any reconfigurer reaching its proposal stage knows exactly which of
the two proposals for a given version number is not stably-defined. Procedures Determine and GetStab/e
propagate the other one. If this initiator reaches its commit stage, its proposal is stably-defined and identical
to the other stably defined proposals for that version. •
Theorem 5.1 (Identical Local Views - Weak) Let r be a reconfiguration initiator. Then
Yp, q E PhaselResp(rJ.(ver(p)= ver('q) =F $eq(p) = seq(q}).
Proof The result follows from Corollary 5.2. Thus, no process commits a local view for version z that
differs from any other processes' version x since all proposals that can possibly reach the commit stage are
identical. •
Remarks
Our algorithms ensure that the state to which the system finally reconfigures _epresents the cumulafit'e
system progress. It accounts for any previous updates (and reeonfigurations) that could (and may) have
been only partially successful, and makes them stable. With respect to an interrupted commit, say of 5ys _ .
the z th system view (Sys _- l - {z}) does not exist until r succeeds in broadcasting its reconfiguration commit
messages.
To see that the new Mgris unique, consider a process, p, that has received an interrogation from r.
It disconnects its incoming channel with every process in HiFaulty(r), and therefore ceases to receive me_
sages, particularly messages relating to exclusion or reconfiguration, from processes in HiFaulty(r). Thus. p
immediately begins to believe that r is the highest ranking non-faulty process.
Finally, within certain limits, the reconfiguration proposal RL, may be more than just a single" process.
Its size is a function of the current size of the system view and must guarantee that majority subsets of
Memb(r) and Memb(r)-{RL,} intersect.
6 Correctness Proofs
Proposition 6.1 The Full Algorithm satisfies GMP-O.
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Proof Followsimmediately from the initial assumptions. •
Proposition 6.2 The Full Algorithm satisfies GMP.I.
Proof A process, p, executes removep(q) only upon receipt of one of the following :
1. Commit(q):Contingent(next-id:L) from Mgr, in which case the Remove Algorithm gives either
(a) recv(Mgr,p, Exclude(q)) ---, faultyp(q) -- rect_Mgr,p,(q):L) -- removep(q),
or, if the condensed algorithm can be applied,
(b) recv(Mgr,p,(q'):(q':L)) -- ((VI EL).faultyp(l)) -- recv(Mgr,p,(q:L')) ---* removep(q).
2. Commit(RLr:r : z):Contingent(invis:Faulty(r)) from some reconfiguration initiator, r. In this case,
observe that proposals always precede commit messages and that p executes faultyp(Rlr) upon receipt
of r's proposal, Propose(RLr:r : x).
To prove that the Full Algorithm satisfies GMP-2 and GMP-3, we rely heavily on Theorem 5.1. To prove
GMP-2, we will exhibit the cuts c_, and show uniqueness of the system view; GMP-3 is a simple corollary of
the theorem.
Theorem 6.1 The Full Algorithm satisfies GMP-2.
Proof Let rr be the process responsible for completing the installation of 5ys x-l and q be the process
removed from 5ys x- t in obtaining $ys x . Define tile cut c_ as :
recv(r_,p,Commit(q)) removep(q)- rect<rr,p, Commit(q))
c_[p] = removep(q) rect,(rr, p,Cornmit(q)) -- removep(q) (3)
quitp otherwise
It is easy to see that c_ is consistent and that c_ << c_+t. We now show $ys(c_, Memb(p, c_))=Memb(p, c_).
From GMP-0 and Proposition 6.1, Pro¢=Memb ° so Memb(p, co) = Proc, and 5ys(co, Memb(p, co)) =
Memb(p, co).
From Corollary 5.2, we know that all stably-defined proposals for the same version number are identical.
Then
Vp • SysZ-t rqH'P(cz).(Memb_ = Memb_ -t - {q})
By definition, Memb_ = Memb(p, cz) for all p, and this leaves Sys(c_:, Memb(p, cz))=Memb(p, cr).
Uniqueness of the system views follows from Corollary 5.2 and the majority requirement for any process
hoping to install a new system view. •
Theorem 6.2 The Full Algorithm salisfies GMP.3.
Proof Recall that successful initiators are those able to reach the commit phase, and that stably-defined
proposals are those issued by successful initiators. Corollary 5.2 shows that all stably-defined proposals ['or
the same version number are identical. Thus, Memb_=Memb_ for each p and q. •
Proposition 6.3 The Full Algorithm satisfies GMP.4.
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Proof Processesonlyupdatetheirlocalviewswith the set difference operation which never adds pro-
fesses. •
Proposition 6.4 The Full Algorithm satisfies GMP.5.
Proof No requests made by processes for a particular Mgr to initiate the exclusion algorithm are 'lost"
when a new Mgr is installed. An outer process's, p's, local beliefs of faultyp(q) are propagated by system
property F2 during reconfiguration. •
7 The Join Procedure
The Join procedure is a simple variation of tile Remove procedure, with restrictions regarding majorit.v
approval. Mgr initiates the join algorithm for process p when it becomes aware of p's desire to join the group.
Recall that 'recovered' processes are treated as new, and different process instances.
In the last section we saw that correctness with respect to both GMP-2 and GMP-3 hinges on majority
Memb, , for z >_ 0 and any processes r and p) intersecting.subsets of 'neighboring' views (Memb_ and r+t
When this was the case, we ensured both uniqueness of system views and complete detection of invisible
commits. Toward proving a general result, let S be an arbitrary set and define the cardinality of a majority
subset of S as p(S) -= ([[_J + 1). Then given sets S and S', the following facts underly the correctness of
our algorithms :
Fact 7.1 For all sets S, if ISI is even, then 2p(S) = ISI + 2.
Fact 7.2 For all sets S, if ISl is odd, then 2/J(S) = ISl + 1.
Fact 7.3 For all sets S and S', if Is'l=lSl+l, and #(S') = p(S) + I then IS'l is even.
Proposition 7.1 For all sets S and S', if Is'l=lSl+t, the, _(s) + > ls'l.
Proof If I_(S') = /_(S) then /J(S) + t4(S') = 2I_(S') and 2/_(S'} > Is'l by definition. Otherwise if
p(S') = p(S)+ l then Fact 7.3 tells us that IS'l is ev_,,. From Fact 7.1 we know 2p(.S") = tS'[ + 2. Therefore
_,(s) + _,(s') = 2_,(s') - 1 = IS'l + 1, giving/_(S) +/_(S') > lS'l. •
With respect to our algorithms, this means that majority subsets of neighboring views will intersect :
each invocation of our algorithm can change the existing system view by either removing or adding ezactly
one process. In this way, either
Add : Mernb_ C Membrx+t and [Mernb,_+t I = lMernb_l + 1,or
Remove: Memb: +z C Mernb_ and IMernb_l= tMernbf+_l + 1.
7.1 The Final Algorithm
For the final algorithm, we alter both the invitation and commit messages to include the desired operation,
'add' or 'remove'. For example, Invite(add(q)), and Commit(remove(p)). Similarly, next(p) and seq(p) will
prepend the relevant operation to each process identifier. The reconfiguration proposal message will also
indicate the desired operation, ver(p) will continue to reflect the instance (or ordinality) of Memb(p). Finally.
the local sets Recovered(p) are analogous to the sets Faulty(p).
Procedures Determine and GetStable are as in Section 4.5.
•) .)
Update Al$orithm- M_;r
Begin :
while true do
begin
await (Recovered(Mgr) _ 0 or Faulty(Mgr) # 0);
if Recovered(Mgr)_ 0
then proc-id -- delete (Recovered(Mgr));
op -- 'add';
else proc-id -- delete (Faulty(Mgr));
op -- 'remove';
while (proc-id_ nil-id) do
begin
Bcast(Mgt ,Memb(Mgr ),lnvite(op(proc-id)));
Vp E memb(mgr).(await (OK(p) or [ault.VMgr(P)));
if fewer than PMgr OKs then quitMg r.
if op='add'
then addMg r (proc-id);
else removeMg r (proc-id);
Get Next( next-id,next-op ) ;
ver(Mgr ) _- ver(Mgr )+1;
Contingencies -- (next-op(next-id):Faulty(Mgr):Recovered(Mgr ))i;
Bcast(mgr,Memb(Mgr ),Commit (op(proc-id)):Contingencies);
proc-id -- next-id;
op -- next-op;
end ;
end ;
End.
Figure 8: The Final Update Algorithm- Mgr
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UpdateAlgorithm- Outer Processes
Begin :
rect_ Mgr, p, Invite(op(proc-id)));
if op='add'
then operatingp(proc-id)
else faultyp(proc-id);
repeat send(p, Mgr,OK(p))
await (Commit(op(proc-id)):Cgt(next-op(next-id):F:R) or faultyp(Mgr));
if faultyp(Mgr ) then exit.
if (pE F) then quitp.
if next-op = 'add'
then operatingp(next-id)
else faultyp(next-id);
V/e F.(faultyp(f));
Vr E R.( operatin#p(r) );
if op='add'
then addp(proc-id);
else remover,(proc-id);
ver(p) -- ver(p)+l;
proc-id -- next-id;
op -- next-op;
until (proc-id=nil-id);
End.
Figure 9: The Final Update Algorithm - Outer Processes
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Reconfiguration Algorithm- Initiator, r
[note: Phase I : Upon full (HiFaulty(r))]
Beast( r,Memb( r ),Interrogate)
Vp EMemb(r). await (OK(seq(p),next(p)) or [aulty,(p));
if fewer than/z, OKs then quit_.
[note: Phase II]
Determine(RL_, invis, v);
Beast(r, Memb(r),(RLr:r : v):(invis ,Faulty(r))));
Vp EMemb(r).(await (OK(p) or faulty_(p)));
if fewer than/Jr OKs then quirt.
[note: Phase III]
if op='add'
then add_(RL,)
else remot, e,(RL,);
Beast( r,Memb( r ), Commit( RL, ):(invis ,Faulty( r ) ));
seq(r) -- (seq(r),RL,);
ver(r) -- ver(r)+l;
begin Mgr role with relevant operation on invis.
Reconfi_guration Al_;orithm - Outer Processes, p
reed<r, p,Interrogate);
if rank(r)<rank(p) then quitp.
send(p, r,OK(seq(p),next(p) ));
Vq EHiFaulty(r).(faultyp(q) );
next(p) *-- (next(p), (? : r :?));
await (Propose((op(proc-id):r : v_):(next-op(next-id),F)) or faultyp(r));
if faultyp(r) then exit the protocol.
if faulty_(p) then qui_.
send(p, r, OK(p));
Vq E F.(faultyp(q));
next(p) -- (op(proc-id):r : vr);
await (Commit((op(proc-id):r:v_):(next-op(next-id),F')) or fau/typ(,'));
if faultyp(r) then exit the protocol.
if faulty,(p) then quitp.
if v_ _ ver(p)
then if op='add'
then add_(proc-id)
else removep(proc-id);
ver(p) _-- ver(p)+t;
seq(p) .-- (seq(p),op(proc-id));
next(p) .-- (next-op(next-id):r : ver(p) + 1);
Vq E F'.(faultyp(q));
Mgr ,-- r.
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Figure 10: Final Reconfiguration Algorithm
Remarks
While Mgr needs responses from a majority of processes to safeguard both GMP-2 and GMP-3 (line FA.1 )
there is a particular situation in which it is permissible to continue without a technical majority. Consider
the reasons that Mgrmay observe faultYMg r (q) while awaiting responses. It may be that q concurrently
believes Mgr faulty and is not responding, or it may be that q (or the connection between the two processes)
failed. Should Mgr 'time-out' on q, and before finishing its await stage, receive notification of q's subsequent
'recovery', Mgrcan, given certain provisos, safely interpret this as q's affirmative response. The provisos
concern the actual manner and semantics in which a process's recovery becomes known.
7.2 Complexity Analysis
Tile sequence and timing of failures affect our algorithm's performance in terms of message complexity.
We consider the 'worst' and 'best' case complexity for our protocol to install a new system view. We also
quantify the gain achievable when we can use the compressed update algorithm.
_-_ 1). Then theDefine nz - [$ys x [, and r_ to be the number of tolerable failures in 5ys z ; rz -= ([" 2 ] +
"worst case _ to install the (x + I) _t system view occurs when there are r_ successive failed (or aborted)
reconfigurations. This results in
rr 5 2 9
- l) - (y - 1))) + - l) - (y - t)) = 5..r - - = o((I • I)
y=l
messages. Fortunately, this specific composition and timing of failures occurs with very low probability.
There are three 'best case' scenarios in which a successive view can be installed : by Mgrusing the
straight-forward two-phase update algorithm, by Mgr using the compressed update algorithm, and by one
successful reconfigurer. In the first case, at most 3n_ - 5 messages are required; in the second, at most
2nz - 3; in the third, at most 5nx - 9.
Finally, if we can take advantage of the condensed algorithm (if failures are not spaced 'too far" apart).
we save substantially in message complexity. For n - 1 _uccessive failure updates, none of which are Mgr.
we require
n-I n-I
(n- 1) +'2. Z(n- x) = (n- 1) + 2n(n- 2) - 2 Z = n2 - 2n- 1 = (n- 1) _ _ n2
r----2 x=2
messages, averaging to n - 1 messages per exclusion. A standard two-phase algorithm would require an
additional _ - 1 messages per exclusion, on the average.
In all of these cases, actual failures may reduce the number of response messages and thereafter the
number in the broadcast.
7.3 Optimality Results
Our GMP protocol combines two-phase (basic update) and three-phase (reconfiguration) commit protocols.
Neither one-phase (i.e. a simple broadcast by a unique coordinator) nor two-phase protocols are sufficient for
solving GMP. This is similar to the result in [20] in which it is shown that a three-phase commit algorithm
is necessary in maintaining the consistency of a distributed database. We now give an intuitive proof of this
for GMP.
[t is not difficult to show that a one-phase algorithm cannot guarantee GMP-3.
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..... Invite(Remove(q))
Commit(Remove(q))q,
Mgr _ _ ..'r'
P
p
p,
next(Q)= (q: Mgr : l)
(? : p :?)
• Commit( Remove( Mgr ))
'Reconfigure
Figure 11: Inability to Determine Invisible Commits
Claim 7.1 A one.phase update algorithm cannot solve GMP when the coordinator can fail.
Proof Let R and S partition Proc, and let r E R, and Mgr E S. Suppose the following are process
histories : starer --faultyR(Mgr), and starts _ faultys(r). Now, r's reconfiguration commit message
(removing Mgr) can only be received by processes in R and Mgr's exclusion commit message (removing r)
can'only be received by processes in S. Then
Memb h = Proc- {Mgr } :/: Pro¢- {r} = Memb_,
violating GMP-3. •
To show that a two-phase algorithm is incapable of satisfying GMP, we exhibit a situation in which it is
impossible for a reconfigurer, knowing that only one of two proposals could possibly have been committed
invisibly, to determine which one it is. If it chooses the wrong one to propagate, GMP-3 is violated.
Claim 7.2 A two-phase reconfiguration algorithm cannot solve GMP when the coordinator can fail.
Proof Consider Figure 11 in which both r and p are reconfigurers and neither Q nor P are majorit._
subsets of Sys ° . Let next(p) be a triple indicating the process p plans to remove next, upon which other
process's command, and which local view number results. Upon completion of its Phase I, r knows that
exactly one of Mgr and p could have been successful in obtaining the requisite majority of responses, but i l
has no way of determining which, if any, of the two did.
Let PhasetResp(r) be the set of processes responding to r's Phase I reeonfiguration message (In Figure 11.
PhaselResp(r)= Q u Pu{r}). Then r can envision one case in which all of PhaselResp(r) (i.e.Q' u P')
responded to Mgr, allowing it to succeed, and another situation in which they responded to p, fulfilling ivs
majority requirement. Thus, r does not know whether to propagate Mgr's proposal or p's. If it guesses
incorrectly, it violates GMP-3. •
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8 Conclusion
We have presented a formal specification of process group membership as it relates to failure detection in
asynchronous systems. The need for formalism in this area (and others) is amply demonstrated by reviewing
the recent literature, as there are many different problems being solved, each of which claim to be 'The
Group Membership Problem'. Not surprisingly, some of these loose specifications admit trivial, and even
incorrect, solutions. We developed a solution to our Group Membership Problem, analyzing it in terms
of both process knowledge and message complexity. We used the former to show that the Fischer-Lynch-
Paterson impossibility result does not apply to this work. The latter is used to compare our solution to
solutions of similar problems. In this regard, our solution is an order of magnitude cheaper than ([15], [5]).
Our solution also improves upon others' ([6], [4]) by handling a continuous stream of failures and recoveries
(provided a majority of processes are not seen to fail during any one instance of the algorithm).
We have formally shown the solution satisfies our problem specification. Moreover, while we have shown
that a three-phase protocol is necessary for reconfiguration, we are currently investigating an optimization
to our algorithm that would allow a process, in specific circumstances, to take advantage of previous commu-
nication phases initiated by other processes. Thus, similar to the way we compressed the update algorithm,
we would pare down required communication when failures of reconfiguration initiators are continuous.
We emphasize that our particular formulation reflects our application's requirements for group member-
ship; how an asynchronous failure detection mechanism uses process groups and the meaning attached to
membership in a process group. Other applications will have different restrictions, and one could weaken
or strengthen the definition of GMP in a number of ways. For example, by not requiring processes to be
members of their own local views, we can create a hierarchical management service. The group might be a
set of clients with exclusion from it would modelling the end of that client's need for the service. Similarly,
we need not require the sets St (used in defining 5ys z ) to be unique; some applications (for example the
Deceit File System [19] and E1 Abbadi and Toueg's database consistency algorithm [1]) may wish to allow
partitions to exist and have them dealt with at a different level. Additionally, requiring every locally com-
mitted view to exist as a system view (our GMP-3) is a restriction inherited from the fact that processes
may take external actions that reflect a particular group composition.
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9 Appendix - Epistemic Analysis of GMP
GMP's specification can be phrased in terms of process knowledge. GMP-3 requires every process's local
version x to be the same as every other process's local version z. GMP-2 says that there must be some point
in every execution when the z th system view exists, resulting in a causally constrained 'consensus'. Thus,
when p commits version x it knows, eventually Mernb_ will be the x th system view. This can be phrased as
(ver(p) -- x) ::* KpC)(Sys x = Mernb_)
Define the formula [sSysView(x) to hold exactly when Sys _ is defined :
tsSysView(_)- A((,,er(p) = _) ^ (A((M,mb_ = Memb_) v down(q))) v down(p))
p q
Noting that fsSysView(x) _ Ap(ver(p) = x), and that (Ai(¢_ =_ ¢',)) _ (Ai ¢i :* Ai ¢i), along the cut
when Sys; is, in fact, defined we obtain (modulo failures)
_sSysVXew(,): A(ve,(p)= _)_ A(z,'/>(IsSysView(_)))
p p
This isnot eventualcommon knowledge [Il]ofthe existenceofSys_ Is Inessence,our specificationisphrased
loosely-enoughso that processesonly know that individualinstancesoflocalviews must be identical.The
specificationdoes not make explicitwhen the system view comes intoexistence,only that itdoes. Because a
processcan never know the composition ofZIP(c),itcan never know whether the processesin Mernb_f'_XP(c)
have updated theirlocalviews to reflect"!x" or have crashed. Notice also that GMP isnot even required
toobtain hindsightabout previoussystem views.This would be phrased as, "at some point in the future,p
knows that,at some point inthe past,the xthsystem view e×isted_ :
(ver(p) = z) _ OKp<_(Mernb_ = Sysx )
though in our protocol, this may be achieved. Up_)n receipt of the x th commit message, "!z', p can reason
about the past. It knows that other processes, also in Memb(p) and still functioning, received and responded
to the z t^ invitation, _?a:". Because channels are FIFO, p also knows these processes received "!z - 1". That
is, when p receives _!x", p knows Sys x-I was a defined system view :
(vet(p) = a:) ::_ Kp_lsSysView(z - 1) (4)
Equation 4 holds along any consistent cut containing p's receipt of _!x ". Notice, though, that it is only' the
existence of successive views that give a process deeper knowledge of past views.
Since IsSysView(x) =_ Ap ver(p) = x, we obtain
(_,r(p) = =) _ K._>A(_e_(q) = =- 1) _ K_o /_ h'v<>IsSysView(x - 2) ¢_ Kp*E,_tsSysView(x - '2)
q q
Conjoining over all processes, p, when Sy$= is defined (along c_) we obtain
fsSysView(x) _ A(ver(p) = r) =_ A Kp_( E_lsSvsView(_: - 2)) _, E_(E_IsSysVie,_(z - 2))
p P
16 Eventual common knowledge would be Ap <>KplsS,vsView(x}.
3O
That is, processes only have knowledge about each others' local views after the fact. Unwinding the above
equations gives the general result
IsSys View( x ) _ ( E <_)Y( IsSys View( z - Y) ).
When we assume Mgr does not fail, we obtain a higher level of consensus than our specification requires.
When p receives "!x', it knows that there is some consistent cut that includes its current, local state (i.e.
p does not take any further steps) along which every other functional process in the group will also receive
"!x _. That is, p knows that it is 'sitting on' a particular consistent cut, but doesn't know whether the other
processes have reached it yet. This is precisely formulated by the concurrency operator, Pp [17], whose
formal semantics are beyond the scope of this paper. This operator is exactly what differentiates concurrent
knowledge from other epistemic formulations (for example [11]).
Then the above statements give
(vet(p) = ._)=_KpG(lsSysYie_v(z)).
Finally, letting _¢ = 5ys t t'_'P(c), the following holds along any cut where 5ys z is defined :
IsSysView(x) ::_ ( A (ver(p) - x)) ::_ A (KpPpIsSysView(x)) =_
pE_ pete
C( [sSys View( x ) =:, Eqo ( [sSys View( x ) ) ) (5)
Equation 5 is the induction rule for concurrent common knowledge; thus, the composition and existence
of tile x th system view are concurrent common knowledge. Alternatively, in the terminology of [21], c_ is a
locally-distinguishable consistent cut, also sufficient for concurrent common knowledge.
This is not the case when Mgrcan fail. When p receives "!x', from either Mgror a reconfigurer, it does
not know whether the broadcaster failed before completing the broadcast. If so, then p will have to be part
of a (further) reconfiguration attempt. The GMP specification only guarantees p that eventually Sys _r will
be defined :
((ver(p) = x) ::_ Kt,_,([sSysView(x))) ::_
((_er(p) = _) _ G<>( A (_er(q) = _))) =
qE_¢
(ver(p) -- x) ::_ It't,<) ( A (Kq<)( A (ver(q') = x))))...
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